This study investigates the information content of undisclosed limit orders before earning announcements for stocks traded on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). We also examine the impact of the removal of broker identities on the informativeness of undisclosed limit orders. We document permanent price impact following the submissions of undisclosed limit orders in both transparent and anonymous market. We find no evidence that informed traders use undisclosed limit orders more often than other types in pre-anonymity market.
INTRODUCTION
This study investigates the submissions of Undisclosed Limit Orders (ULOs) before earnings announcement for stocks traded on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). In doing so, this study addresses two research questions. Firstly, are ULOs submitted by more informed traders prior to the release of earning announcements? Secondly, does the information content of ULOs increase or decrease after the ASX's switch to anonymous trading system on November 28, 2005?
When making trading decision, investors can choose to place market orders or limit orders. Corrado and Jordan (2005, p. 153) define market order as "an order to buy or sell securities marked for immediate execution at current market price. In contrast, limit order is an order to buy or sell securities with a specified "limit" price. The order can be executed only at the limit price or better". On the ASX, traders can also choose to submit ULOs which allow them to partially reveal their limit orders' size. The purpose of ULOs submissions is that these orders allow traders to hide their full trading intentions (Aitken et al., 2001 ).
This study analyses the submissions of ULOs around earning announcements, the periods associated with high information asymmetry. This examination is important for various reasons. Firstly, hidden orders are important components of equity markets. Aitken et al. (1996) finds that a total of 6% of all submitted orders on the ASX were undisclosed, accounting for 28% of total volume. International evidences are reported in Degryse (1999) who document that hidden orders account for over 16% of the order book in the Brussels CATS system. Similarly, Bessembinder et al. (2009) find that hidden orders represent 44% of all order volume in their sample of 100 firms traded on the Euronext Paris. Anand and Weaver (2004) also observe that hidden orders account for approximately 7% of submitted total volume on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX).
Secondly, the findings of the study will reveal whether ULOs are used by more informed traders and thus, highlight the way information is incorporated into prices. Thirdly, given there is a current trend of equity markets moving towards anonymous trading system and remove the identities of brokers 1 , it is important to understand how traders react to this reduction in market transparency. More specifically, this study analyses ULOs submissions around the last earning announcement before the removal of broker IDs on 25 November 2005 and the first earning announcement after the switch to anonymous market.
Finally, the examination of ULOs submissions on the ASX is further motivated by unique features of ULOs on the ASX. In comparison to iceberg orders on other stock exchanges, the hidden portion of ULOs on the ASX has the same execution priority as the disclosed part. In contrast, hidden portions of iceberg orders are treated as new order submissions in the order book and thus, lose execution priority. As a result, hidden portions of iceberg orders face the risk of not being executed in the required time frame (Esser and Monch,2007) .
This study contributes to the current literature in the following ways. Firstly, this study analyses the submissions of ULOs around earning announcements. This examination contributes to the current debate regarding whether informed traders use limit orders. Prior literature has been inconclusive regarding this issue. Glosten (1994) and Seppi (1997) argue that informed traders use only market orders. In contrast, more recent studies such as Chakravarty and Holden (1995) , Bloomfield et al. (2005) , Anand et al. (2005) Secondly, w extend the current literature by examining the impact of the removal of broker IDs (the move to anonymity) on the information content of ULOs. Prior literature on broker anonymity tends to focus on the impact of the removal of broker IDs on liquidity (ComertonForde et al., 2005; Foucault et al., 2007; Comerton-Forde and Tang, 2009; Duong and Kalev, 2010a) or the information content of the limit order book (Foucault et al., 2007; Duong and Kalev, 2010b) . One exception is Lepone and Mistry (2009) , who document no significant changes in the information content of ULOs after the removal of broker IDs on the ASX.
This study differs from prior literature by investigating the effect of the move to anonymity on the submissions of ULOs around earning announcements. Since earning announcements are associated with high information asymmetry, it will be more suitable to examine the impact of the removal of broker IDs on the information content of ULOs based on the period surrounding earning announcements. Given the importance of ULOs in the trading process of the ASX, and the fact that ULOs allow traders to hide their identity and their order size in anonymous market, the findings of this study will contribute to the understanding of the order exposure strategies of investors in transparent and anonymous market.
Investigating ULOs submissions during the period before earnings announcements, we document strong support for the permanent price impact of ULOs in both transparent and anonymous market. However, we do not observe significant difference in price reactions after the submission of disclosed and undisclosed limit orders in transparent market. After the move to anonymity, ULOs become more informative than DLOs, especially in sell orders.
Overall, our results suggest that informed traders do incorporate ULOs in their order submission strategies, especially after the removal of broker IDs on the ASX.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of existing literature. Section 3 describes the data and research methodology. Section 4 presents results and discussions. Section 5 concludes this paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW

The information content of undisclosed limit orders
The issue of the information content of undisclosed limit orders is related to the literature on the use of limit and market orders by informed traders. Early studies, such as Glosten (1994) and Seppi (1997) argue that informed traders only submit market orders, thus, limit orders contain no information regarding future price movements. In contrast, more recent studies provide both theoretical background and empirical evidence supporting the use of limit orders by informed traders. Chakravarty and Holden (1995) show that for a risk-neutral informed trader, it is more profitable for informed traders to combine market and limit orders instead of only placing market orders. Similarly, Wald and Horrigan (2005) suggest that rather than submitting market orders, it is optimal for informed traders to place slightly discounted limit orders, often inside the bid-ask spread, because the execution risk for these limit orders is minimal. Kaniel and Liu (2006) also support the use of limit orders by informed traders. The authors highlight that when the expected time horizon for informed traders' private information is high, informed traders are more likely to submit limit orders instead of market orders. Moreover, when the probability that the information is long-lived is high enough, limit orders might be more informative than market orders. With the availability of limit order book data, various studies has documented the informativeness of limit orders for future volatility (see, among others, Ahn et al., 2001; Foucault et al., 2007; Pascual and Veredas, 2010; Duong and Kalev, 2010b) Regarding hidden orders, Harris (1996) argues that this type of order can help uninformed traders mitigate the option value of a standing limit order. In contrast, Monais (2006) develops a theoretical framework where an informed trader with long-lived private information on security value submits large limit orders with hidden depth. This order submission strategy allows the informed traders to protect their trading intention by mimicking the behaviour of uninformed liquidity traders.
Empirical evidence on the information content of ULOs on the ASX is provided by Aitken et al. (2001) . These authors find that there is no difference in stock price reaction between disclosed and undisclosed limit orders. This finding implies that undisclosed limit orders are not used by informed traders. In the context of using hidden orders in the periods surrounding earning announcements, Chakrabarty & Shaw (2008) report that hidden order trade volume, the number of hidden order executed, hidden order trade size and the full size of hidden orders executed all increase. They also find that changes in hidden order activity at earning announcements are related to firm's pre-announcement information environment, the information conveyed by the earnings announcement and changes in quoted liquidity. These findings provide support for the use of hidden orders by informed traders before earning announcements. Bessembinder et al. (2009) 
document that for stocks traded on the Euronext
Paris, hidden orders are associated with lower implementation shortfall cost and smaller opportunity cost. These results imply that hidden orders are used primarily by traders without superior information on future security price movements.
The removal of broker identities and the information content of undisclosed limit orders
Foucault et al. (2007) Comerton- Forde and Tang, 2009; Duong and Kalev, 2010a) . The effect of anonymity on the information content of the order book is documented in Foucault et al. (2007) and Duong and Kalev (2010b) . Foucault et al. (2007) present evidence of a decline in the informativeness of the bid-ask spread, which reflects the information contained in the first step of the limit order book, after the move to anonymity on the Euronext Paris. Examining the limit orders at and beyond the first level of the limit order book, Duong and Kalev (2010b) document an increase in the information content of limit orders after the removal of broker identities on the ASX. Regarding the effects of anonymity on ULOs submissions, Lepone and Mistry (2009) come to the conclusion that the removal of broker identities has no significant effect on the information content of ULOs on the ASX. It is important to note that this finding is based on "normal" trading period, without any analysis for the periods surrounding firm-specific announcements.
The current study investigates the effect of the move to anonymity of the ASX on the information content of ULOs during the periods before earning announcements. Since using ULOs in anonymous market allows informed traders to hide both their identities and their trading intention (order size), it is expected that the information content of ULOs will increase after the removal of broker identities on the ASX.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We investigate the submissions of ULOs around earning announcements based on limit order book data provided by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia Pacific. The limit order book data contain details on every order submitted to the ASX, including the order type (order submission, order revision, order cancellation), the date and time to the nearest hundredth of a second, stock code, order price, order volume and order direction (buy or sell order). Each new order is assigned a unique identification number (ID), which allow for the tracking of every order from its initial submission through to any revision, cancellation or execution. This dataset also contains information regarding whether the order is partially revealed. We also collect intraday bid-ask quotes date from SIRCA. These data provide information on stock code, date, time to the nearest hundredth of a second, and the best bid and ask quotes in the limit order book. We remove those all observation with negative bid quote or ask quote and all observations with higher bid quote than ask quote.
The To measure the information content of the different order types, we measure stock price reaction at 1, 5 and 30 minutes after order submission. For limit orders, the best opposite-side quote prevailing at the time of submission is taken as the reference price. For market orders, same-side quotes are used because the execution of a market order results in a change in the opposite-side of the order book. The comparison of stock price reaction after ULOs, DLOs and MOs submissions will reveal whether ULOs have larger price impact and thus, contain more information than other DLOs and MOs. Table 1 [INSERT buy ULOs, we only observe significant differences in 30-minute return but not in 1-minute or 5-minute return. This finding shows that ULOs makes no difference impact on price at shortrun but it creates permanent impact on long-run.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
CONCLUSION
This study investigates the submission of undisclosed limit orders around earning announcement in periods before and after the removal of broker IDs on the ASX. In both transparent and anonymous market, we show significant price reactions following the submission of ULOs. We also find no significant in price reactions after the submission of disclosed and undisclosed limit orders in transparent market. However, in anonymous market, ULOs are more informative than DLOs, especially in sell orders. In the final analysis, we compare the price impact of ULOs in the pre-and post-anonymity period. We only find significant difference between the information content of buy ULOs in two markets at 30 minute interval. This table presents results of the investigation of stock price reaction at 1 minute, 5 minute and 30 minute after the submissions of undisclosed limit orders (ULOs), market orders (MOs) and disclosed limit orders (DLOs) during the four weeks prior to the last earnings announcements in transparent market. For ULOs and DLOs, stock price reaction at 1 minute, 5 minute and 30 minute for a buy (sell) order is measured as the difference between the natural logarithm of the best ask (bid) quote at 1 minute, 5 minute and 30 minute after the order submission and the natural logarithm of the best ask (bid) quote at the time of the order submission. For MOs, stock price reaction at 1 minute, 5 minute and 30 minute for a buy (sell) order is measured as the difference between the natural logarithm of the best bid (ask) quote at 1 minute, 5 minute and 30 minute after the order submission and the natural logarithm of the best bid (ask) quote at the time of the order submission. For each ULO, matching DLOs and MOs of the same stock are selected such that they are of order sizes within 10% of the ULO; in the same direction (buy/sell); within 30 days of each other; not within 30 minutes before or after the submission of each other and with a current bid-ask spread in terms of ticks, within two ticks of the bid-ask spread at the time of the ULO submission. The numbers within the parentheses are the test statistics for the null hypothesis that returns after 1 minute, 5 minutes and 30 minutes are equal to zero. "t-statistics" is the test statistic for the null hypothesis of equal mean returns for ULOs and DLOs. This table presents results of the investigation of stock price reaction at 1 minute, 5 minute and 30 minute after the submissions of undisclosed limit orders (ULOs), market orders (MOs) and disclosed limit orders (DLOs) during the four weeks prior to the last earnings announcements in anonymous market. For ULOs and DLOs, stock price reaction at 1 minute, 5 minute and 30 minute for a buy (sell) order is measured as the difference between the natural logarithm of the best ask (bid) quote at 1 minute, 5 minute and 30 minute after the order submission and the natural logarithm of the best ask (bid) quote at the time of the order submission. For MOs, stock price reaction at 1 minute, 5 minute and 30 minute for a buy (sell) order is measured as the difference between the natural logarithm of the best bid (ask) quote at 1 minute, 5 minute and 30 minute after the order submission and the natural logarithm of the best bid (ask) quote at the time of the order submission. For each ULO, matching DLOs and MOs of the same stock are selected such that they are of order sizes within 10% of the ULO; in the same direction (buy/sell); within 30 days of each other; not within 30 minutes before or after the submission of each other and with a current bid-ask spread in terms of ticks, within two ticks of the bid-ask spread at the time of the ULO submission. The numbers within the parentheses are the test statistics for the null hypothesis that returns after 1 minute, 5 minutes and 30 minutes are equal to zero. "t-statistics" is the test statistic for the null hypothesis of equal mean returns for ULOs and DLOs. This table presents results of the comparison of the stock price reactions following the submission of undisclosed limit orders (ULOs) in transparent and anonymous market. Stock price reaction at 1 minute, 5 minute and 30 minute for a buy (sell) order is measured as the difference between the natural logarithm of the best ask (bid) quote at 1 minute, 5 minute and 30 minute after the order submission and the natural logarithm of the best ask (bid) quote at the time of the order submission. "t-statistics" is the test statistic for the null hypothesis of equal mean returns for ULOs in transparent and anonymous market. 
